ABSTRACT: This is a defense and illustration of the statistical law of Pareto, and an informal introduction to its role--and that of 7 certain of its kins--in the study of price variations, of income distributions, of the distributions of the sizes of firms and cities, and of related questions in economics and in other social and physical )-,sciences.
1.
Introduction.
Neglect and even contempt often mark the attitude of statisticians and of mathematical economists towards Pareto's well-known empirical discovery, that there exist two constants C and a< > 0, such that the relative number of incomes exceeding u can-for large values of ube written
in the form Cu (footnote 1).
It is not very seriously questioned, however, that the law of Pareto repres-ats very satisfactor y, not only the "tail" of the distribution of personal income, but also tiuse of the distribution of firm sizes and of city sizes. In fact, the game consisting of searching for new instances of that law has been at times very popular and quite successful, although seldom respected [see for example the writings of George Kingsley Zipf (17) (18) ].
We think therefore that the law of Pareto has been neglected because it does -t represent the middle range of incomes--which may be the more important far certain purposes--and also because it is so lacking of theoretical motivation--at least within the context of elementary probability theory. We believe, however, that in the light of modern advances in the pure theory of random variables and of stochastic processes, this remarkable finding deserves a systematic new examination.
We shall see indeed that the law of Pareto literally thrusts itself upon anyone who takes seriously the models of economics based on maximization or upon linear aggregation, upon anyone who takes a cautious view of the origin of the economic data, and upon anyone who believes in the influence on economics of the physical distribution of various scarce natural resources.
We shall also show the following: when the "spontaneous activity" of a system is ruled by a Paretian process, the causally structural features of the system are likely to be very much more hidden by noise than is the case where the noise is Gaussian.
In fact, causal structures may be totally "drowned out." On the other hand, Paretian noise generates all kinds of "patterns" that seem to be perfectly clear-cut but have no value for purposes of prediction. Thus, in the presence of a Paretian "spontpe''cus activity," the scientist is faced by an unexpectedly heavy burden of proof, and the basic problem of the validation of laws acquires many new and indeed perturbing features.
2.
We shall see that the most important features of the law of Pareto are linked to the length of its tail, and not to its extreme skewness. In fact,
in the cases where we shall deal with random variables that can also take large negative values, we shall have to introduce a family of bilateral Paretian distributions, which may even be symmetric. Hence, the extreme skewness of the distribution of income must be considered as being a secondary feature of those Paretian variables that are constrained to be positive.
The general "tone" of this paper is indicated by its title. We shall not attmept to treat any point exhaustively, nor to fully specify all the conditions of validity of our assertions, which are discussed in detail in the publications referred to in the bibliography.
The last section of this paper will examine two of the most influential critiques of the law of Pareto.
Thegeneral principle of our "method of invariant laws."
The approach used in our studies of the law of Pareto may seem unusual in the context of social science, but it resembles a method very familiar in physics (footnote 2).
To begin with, we find that the various "microscopic models," which could be considered as explaining "why" such and such a version of the law of Pareto is encountered in such and such a domain, are at the very best hardly more convincing than the law itself, because they are of much less general applicability, and because seemingly slight and irrelevant changes in the hypotheses completely change the result. Moreover, we believe that the stress upon generative models of the law of Pareto has handicapped the study of its remarkable properties.
Therefore, we have preferred to center our work in this area around the study of the actual conditions of empirical observation, as practiced in economics and in other social sciences. By "observation" we not only mean the activity of the scholar who observes to describe, but also that of the entrepreneur who observes to act. In both cases, we note that, even if irreducible economic quantities had a real existence, they could hardly ever be observed directly; they would rather be altered by some ill-known sequence of all kinds of manipulation.
In most practical problems, very little can be done about this difficulty, and one must make do with whatever approximation to the desired data is actually available. But inappropriate data are a notorious handicap in theoretical work, since economic relationships are usually relative to conceptual irreducible economic quantities, and cannot generally be expected to be left invariant by the manipulations performed before actual measurement.
That is, the analytical formulas, by which they may be described, must be expected to change in form markedly, whenever one applies one of the basic transformations.
As a result, however great the practical importance of these relationships, and hence however great the efforts to understand them, there is a good chance that their form will be discovered later, and that they will forever remain known with lesser precision, than the phenomena that "happen" to be in some sense invariant with respect to the maximum number of observational transformations, such as the following (which are all fundamental, but unequally so).
Linear aggregation or simple addition of various quantities in their common natural scale. For example, aggregates of various kinds of income are better known than each kind taken separately. Long-term changes in most economic quantities are better known than the more desirable medium-term changes; moreover, the meaning of "medium-term" differs between series, so that a law that is not invariant under aggregation would be apparent in some series, and not in others, and could not be firmly established. A number of operations of aggregation also occur in the context of firm sizes, in particular when "old" firms merge within a "new" one.
The most universal interpretation of aggregation occurs, however, in linear models that add the (weighted) contributions of several "causes", or more generally embody linear relationships between several variables or between the current and the past values of a single variable (autoregressive schemes). The scholar's preference for such models is of course based upon the unhappy but unquestionable fact that mathematics offers few workable non-linear tools to the scientist.
There is clearly nothing new in our emphasis upon invariance under aggregation. It is indeed well known that the sum of two independent Gaussian variables is itself Gaussian, and --after the ease of analytical manipulation --this is the principal reason for using Gaussian "error terms" in linear models. However, the Gaussian law is alone to be invariant under aggregation only if one excludes random variables with infinite populations moments (whereas we shall not exclude them; see section 5).
(Besides, the Gaussian law is not invariant under our other two observational transformations).
Let us also note that one may aggregate a small or a very large number of quantities. Whenever possible, "very large" is approximated by "infinite", so that aggregation is intimately related with the question of the central limit theorem concerning the behavior of limits of sums of random variables.
A second fundamental transformation is weighted mixture, or compounding.
For example, a compounded lottery ticket would be one in which a first preliminary chance drawing would determine in which of several final drawings the gambler has the right to participate. This provides a model for all kinds of actually observed variables: For example, if one does not know the precise origin of a given set of income data, one may consider that they were picked at random among a number of possible basic distributions; the distribution of observed incomes would then be the mixture of the basic distributions.
Similarly, price data often refer to grades of a commodity that are not precisely known and hence can be assumed to be randomly determined. Finally, the notion of a firm is somewhat undeterminate (what about almost wholly owned, but legally distinct subsidiaries?), and available data refer to firms that may vary in size between individual establishments and holding companies; such mixture may be represented by random compounding.
In many cases, one has to deal with a combination of the above operations:
for example, after a wave of mergers has hit an industry, one may consider that the distribution of "new" firms is the mixture of the distribution of companies not involved in a merger. of the distribution of companies made up of the sum of two old firms, and perhaps even of sums of more than two firms.
The final basic transtoxmation is maximizing choice, i.e., the selection of the largest or smallest quantity in a set. For example, it may be that all we know about a set of quantities is the size of the one chosen by a profitmaximizer. If one must use historical data, one must often expect to find that only the exceptional largest or smallest events are fully reported, for example, droughts or floods, famines (and the names of the"Bad Kings" who reigned in those times), or "Good times" (and the names of the "Good Kings").
Mixture and maximization are often mixed, since many data are a mixture of fully reported periods and of reporting limited to the extreme cases. Of course, the singular character of the asymptotic law of Pareto holds only under additional assumptions, so that the problem will surely not be exhausted by our present approach. We shall, indeed, consider N independent random variables, Un (1< n ( N), following the weak (asymptotic) form of the law of Pareto, with the same exponent,(:
The behavior of Pr(Un <-u) for large u will be examined in section 7.
Keeping the proofs in footnotes, we shall begin by quoting some statements that imply that a Paretian behavior of Un is sufficient for the three types of asymptotic invariance --up-to-scale. The sign E will always N refer to the addition of the terms relative to the/possible values of the index n.
6.
Weighted Mixture. Suppose that the random variable UW is a weighted mixture of the Un, i.e. that it has the probability Pn of being identical to Un. One can show (footnote 3) that this 1 UW is also asymptotically Paretian, and that its scale parameter is CW -PnCn, which is the weighted average of the separate scale coefficients Cn.
Maximizing choice. Let UM be the largest of the variables Un, (that is, the one that turns a posteriori to be the largest, when the values of all the Un are known; there is no simple way of saying which one of N random variables is the largest!).
One can show (footnote 4) that this UM is also asymptotically Paretian, with a scale parameter which is the sum of the separate scale coefficients Cn.
Aggregation. Let CA be the sum of the random variables Un. One can show (footnote 5 ) that it is also asymptotically Paretian, with a scale parameter that is again the sum of the separate Cn. Thus, the sum of the Un behaves asymptotically exactly like the largest of them.
Mixture combined with aggregation --an operation that occurs in the theory of mergers --also leaves the law of Pareto invariant up to scale.
The converse of the above statements are true only in the first approximation: in order for the invariances-up-to-scale to hold, the distributions of the Un need not strictly follow the law of Pareto; butthe actual generalizations are in practice quite negligible.
Strictly invariant and limit distributions.
Let us now abandon asymptotics and let us introduce Frechet's and Levy s kins of the law of Pareto, by imitating (with a different interpretation), a famous principle of physics: to require that the random variables Un be strictly invariant --(up-to-scale) with tespect to one of our three transformations. This means the following: let the N random variables Un all follow--up to changes of scale--the same law as the variable U, so that Un can be written as anU, where an > 0; we shall require that UW (respectively UM Of UA) also follow--up to scale--the same law as U. For that, it must be possible to write UW (respectively UM or U A) in the form awU (respectively aMUor a!) is some positive function of the numbers a It turns out that the conditions of invariance lead to somewhat similar equations in all three cases (see footnote 6
).
More precisely, one obtains the following results:
7.
Maximization. The invariant laws must be of the form FM(u)-exp(-u ),
which is due to Maurice Fr~chet (reference 5 ). They are clearly Paretian, since--for large u--FM can be approximated by I -Cu .
They also "happen" to have the remarkable property of being the limit distributions Mixture. In this case, invariance leads to Fw (u)-l-Cu" D, i.e., to the law of Pareto extended down to u = 0, an expression which corresponds to an infinite total probability. One notes immediately that such a solution is strictly speaking inacceptable. However, it must not be rejected offhand, because in many cases in practice U is further restricted by some relation of the form C< a . u< b, leading to a perfectly acceptable conditional probability distribution.
Aggregation.
Finally, aggregation leads to random variables that are part of the family of Lfvy's "stable distributions," other members of which will be encountered later. (See reference 4 ) One knows dFA (u) in closed form for the stable law with°< -2 (which is the Gaussian in a sense; it is a limit case of the other stable Paretian laws, but is not itself Paretian) that with t-1/2, which plays a central role in return to equilibrium in coin tossing. Otherwise, no closed analytic expression is known for the stable FA(u); Ldvy has shown, however, thatunless-< -2, they asymptotically follow the law of Pareto of exponent • . However, when we discussed this introduction with the senior author in 1958 (ten years after the appearance of the original Russian book), we found that these papers had not materialized after all -for lack of applications! Basically, the only fairly well-known practical instance of a stable distribution remains the law, due to Holtsmark but often rediscovered, that rules the Newtonian attraction between randomly distributed stars (see reference 7). Anyway, our plea, that stable laws be counted among the most "coumon" probability distributions, has not been made void by the Gnedenko-Kolmogoroff book, 9.
4.
On the value of the evidence of doubly logarithmic graphs.
The above limitation in the value of -< brings us to another, quite different, aspect of the general problem of observation, relative to the practical significance of statements having only an asymptotic validity. Indeed, in order to verify empirically the law of Pareto, the usual 'first step is to draw the so-called doubly logarithmic graph of log 1 0 l -
as a function of log 1 0 u. One should find that this graph is a straight line with the slope.--< , or at least that it rapidly becomes straight with this slope. But let us look closer at the empirical point of largest u. Except for the distributions of incomes, one has at most a sample of 1000 or 2000 items; or one may otherwise know the value of u that is exceeded with the frequency i -F(u) -1000 or 20001. That is, the "height" of the empirical doubly logarithmic graph will at the very best cover three units of the decimal logarithm of I -F. The "width" of this graph will therefore be at the very best equal to 3/o( units of the decimal logarithm of u. However if one wants to estimate reliably the value of the slope o( , it is necessary that the width of the graph be close to one unit: therefore, one cannot have any trust whatsoever in data that suggest that e< is larger than 3, and the practical range of alphas is anyway hardly wider than in the case of Ldvy's Paretian laws.
Looking at the same question from another angle, let us plot a Guassian, lognormal negative binomial or exponential distribution on doubly logarithmic paper: since these distributions are all very "short-tailed," the slope of the graph will become asymptotically infinite. However, in the region of probabilities down to 1000-, the dispersion of empirical data is liable to generate--on doubly logarithmic coordinates--the appearance of a straight line having a high but finite slope. In the words of F. Macaulay (see There is another way of describing curve-fitting using special papers:
one may say that the maximum distance between the sample curve and some reference curve-.-preferably a straight line--defines a kind of distance
10.
between two alternative probability laws. Any special paper--whether it be lognormal or Paretian--should be used only in ranges where the distances which it defines are sensitive to the differences that count from the viewpoint of the problems at hand. Hence, the conservative thing to do is often to consider several hypotheses, i.e., to use several kinds of paper.
To sum up, if one takes account of mixtures, maximization and practical measurement the range of values of alpha is reduced to the interval from 0 to 3. If one also takes account of aggregation,cK must fall between 0 and 2 (actually, the range of apparent alphas is somewhat wider).
5.
The problem of the meaning of random variables with infinite population moments.
Such Paretian laws are extraordinarily long-tailed, as measured by Gaussian standards.
In particular, if c< < 2, the population second moment is infinite. It should be stressed, however, that there is nothing improper in such a notion.
It is of course true that--observed variables being finite--the sample moments of all orders are themselves finite for finite sample sizes; but this does not exclude that they become infinite with the sample size.
It may also be true that the asymptotic behavior of samples is practically irrelevant, because the sizes of all empirical samples are by nature finite.
For example, one may argue that the history of cotton prices is a finite set of data from 1816 to 1958, because speculation on cotton was very much diminished by the 1958 acts of the Congress of the United States. Similarly, when one studies the sizes of United States cities, one deals with statistical populations for which the sample size is bounded. Even for continuing series, one may well argue for "aprbs moi, le D6luge," and neglect any time horizon longer than a man's life. Hence, the behavior of the moments for infinite sample sizes may seem unimportant. But all that this actually implies is that the only meaningful consequences of infinite population moments are those relative to the sample moments of increasing sub-sets of our various bounded universes. Here, the situation is basically as follows: (see Figures 2 and 3) There is no question that, wherever the sample second moment is ob-
11.
served to rapidly "stabilize" around the value corresponding to the total set, it is useful to take that value as an estimate of the population second moment of i conjectural infinite population, from which the sample could have been drawn. But suppose that the sample second moments corresponding to increasing sub-sets continue to vary widely, even when the sample size approaches the maximum imposed by the subject matter. From the viewpoint of sampling, this must be interpreted as meaning that the distribution is such that even the largest available sample is too small for reliable estimation of the population second moment, or--in other words--that a wide range of values of the population second moment are equally compatible with the data. Moreover, it frequently turns out that this range of values of the moment happens to include the value "infinity," implying that facts can be equally well described by assuming that the "actual" moment is extremely large but finite, or by assuming that it is infinite.
In order to motivate the alternative that we prefer, let us point out that a realistic, scientific model must not depend too critically upon quantities that are difficult to measure.
The finite-moment model is unfortunately very sensitive to the value of the population second moment, and there are many other ways in which the first assumption, which of course is the more reasonable a priori, also happens to be by far the more cumbersome analytically. The second assumption on the contrary leads to simple analytical developments, and the rapidity of growth of the sample second moment can be so adjusted that it would lead to absurd results only if one applied it to "infinite" samples, that is, if one raised problems devoid of concrete meaning.
In other words, there is no danger in assuming, as we shall do, that an intrinsically bounded variable is drawn at random from an infinite population of of unbounded variables having an infinite second moment. But all these infinities are a relative matter, entirely dependent upon the statisticians' span of interest; as the maximum useful sample size increases the range of the estimates of the second moment will steadily narrow. Hence, beyond a limit, the second moments of some variables may have to be considered as actually being finite; conversely, there are variables for which the second moment must be considered as being finite only if the useful sample size is shorter than some limit.
Actually, our use of infinity is a most coimmon one in statistics, 12.
insofar as it concerns the function max(ul,u 2 P .... UN) of the observations. We are sure that, from the practical viewpoint, these difficulties will eventually be solved. However, as of today, they are so severe as to even require a re-examination of the meaning of the popular but 13.
vague concept of "a structure." It is indeed a truism for the working scientist, especially in fields where actual experimentation is impossible, that the major danger of his trade is the possibility of confusion between patterns that can only be used for "historical" description of his records, and those that are also useful for forecasting some aspects of the future.
In particular, as we have seen, modern inference theory has taught us always to list both the accepted and the rejected possibilities, and the scientists' major problem is frequently topetermine whether a conjectured "relation" is significant with respect to what may be generally called "spontaneous activity," which is the resultant of all the influences that one cannot or does not want to control in the problem at hand, and which is conveniently described with the help of various stochastic models. A useful vocabulary considers the search for laws as a kind of extraction and identification of a "signal" in the presence of "noise."
It is not enough however that all the members of a cultural group agree upon the patterns that they read into a historical record. Indeed, although there is unanimity in the interpretation of certain of Dr. Rohrschach's inkblots, they have no significance from the viewpoint of science as a system of predictions. Broadly speaking, a pattern is scientifically significant and is felt to have chances of being repeated, only if in some sense its"likelihood" of having occurred by chance is very small. This kind of significance is obviously to be assessed with the help of the tools of statistics; unfortunately, those have been mostly designed to deal with Gaussian alternatives and, when the chance alternative is Paretian, they are not conservative enough by far. We believe that one will be able to go around this difficulty, but, whenever one works in a field where the background noise is Paretian, one must begin by taking an accurate measure of the weight of the burden of proof that one faces, and which is closer to that of history and autobiography than to that of physics.
The same thought can be presented in more optimistic sounding words, by saying that if a "mere chance" can so readily be confused with a causal structure, it is itself entitled to the same noble designation, rather than the less high-sounding term "noise." That is, "noise" may perhaps be reserved for the Gaussian error terms, or its binomial or Poisson kins, which are indeed universally dislikedas sources of nuisance, but are seldom respected as sources of anything interesting-looking.
14.
The situation is made worse by the fact that, in models known to be very structured (e.g., to be autoregressive) with a Paretian noise, one should expect the generated paths to be much more influenced by the noise, and much less by the structure, than is the case in the Gaussian case--where noise is already very influential. We hope to develop this point in later editions of reference 11 .
The association between the law of Pareto and "interesting patterns"
is nowhere more striking than in the outcome of accumulated tosses of a coin.
Indeed, the following fact is examined in the later parts of most good books on probability: suppose that we break into the game of tossing a fair coin, which "Peter" and "Paul" have been playing since sometime in the early eighteenth century. Whenever the coin falls on "heads," Peter wins a dollar (or perhaps rather a thaler); whenever the coin falls on tails, Paul wins, and let T designate the time it takes for Peter and Paul's fortunes to return to the state they were in at the moment when we broke in. For large values t of T, one has the relation:
Probability that the fortunes return to their initial
Lstate after a time greater than t -(constant) t which is the law of Pareto of exponent 1/2.
However, it is notorious that gamblers see an enormous amount of interesting detail in the past records of accumulated coin tossing gains (even more than in the separate results of tossing a coin), and that they are prepared to risk their fortunes on the proposition that these details are not due to mere chance. Similar phenomena ought to be expected whenever the law of Pareto applies: that is, the stochastic models associated with those phenomena can well dispense with any kind of built-in causal structure, and yet generate paths in which the unskilled or the skilled eye equally well distinguishes details that are usually associated with causal relations. Similar details would be so unlikely in the path generated by a Gaussian process, that they wbuld surely be considered as significant for forecasting. But this is not so in the Paretian case: there, from the viewpoint of prediction, those structures should be considered as being perceptual illusions: they are in the observer's current records and in his brain, but not in the mechanism that has generated these records and that will generate the future events.
Bearing in mind the existence of such models, let us suppose that we 15.
have to infer a process from the data. We believe that, in many cases, a non-structured Paretian universe is capable of accounting so well for the observations, that it will be extremely difficult at best to choose between alternative models, one of which consciously imbeds some causal relations, while the other has no structure other than stochastic.
A student's belief in the existence of "genuine" structures will therefore be challengeable only with the greatest difficulty; conversely, in order to communicate such a belief to others, with the standards of creibility current in physical science, one will need much more than the tests of significance that some social scientists shrug off at the end of a discussion. Such a situation will--as we said--require a drastic sharpening of the distinction between patterns that--whichever the scholar's diligence--can only be useful for historical purposes, and those usable for forecasting the future.
The question we have in mind can be well illustrated by the problem of the significance of "cycles." With the help either of many charts or of the most sophisticated methods of Fourier analysis, it is comparatively easy to show that almost any record of the past is made up of some combination of swings. But the same is also true for a wide variety of artificial series generated by random processes with no built-in cyclic behavior whatsoever, and it is known that, however great their skill, cycle researchers seldom risk firm short-term forecasts.
Could we then ask, using Keynes% terms, How far are these curves...meant to be no more than a piece of historical curve-fitting and description, and how far do they make inductive claims with reference to the future as well as the past?
It may also be noted that, because of the invariance of the law of Pareto with respect to various transformations, one cannot hope that a simple way out will be provided by arguing that only the genuine structures will be apparent to all observers. That is, the only criterion of trust-'worthiness is replicability in time. This again may not be a straightforward matter, because in an important respect the models of Paretian spontaneous activity diverge from the standards of "operationalism" suggested by philosophers. Indeed, in order to explain by mere chance any given set of phenomena, it will be necessary to imbed them in a universe that also contains such a fantastic number of other possibilities, that billions of years may be necessary to run through all of them. Hence, within 16.
our lifetime, any given configuration will occur at most once and one could hardly at all define a probability for them on the basis of sample frequency. This conceptual difficulty is of course common knowledge among physicists and it is to be regretted that the philosophical discussions of the foundations of probability so seldom investigate this point. In a way, the physicists' models freely indulge in practices that for the historian are mortal sins: to rewrite history as it would have been, if Cleopatra's nose had a different shape. Our sins are even worse than the physicists', because their contrafactual histories turn out after all to be all very close to some kind of a "norm," a property which our models certainly do not possess.
We think some examples are in order here, although this section is already too long by far. We shall limit ourself to two re-interpretations of the coin-tossing record plotted on Figure  4 .
First of all, forgetting the origin of that figure, let us imagine that it is a geographical cross-section of a new part of the world, in which all the regions below the bold horizontal line are under water. Let us also imagine that this chart was just brought home by an explorer (we found that most observers have no great difficulty in indulging in such a fling of the imagination), and that our problem is to decide whether it was due to cause or to chance.
The naive defense will readily resort to the Highest Cause, using our graph as fresh evidence that God created Heaven and the Earth, using the same template for all the Earth, and that He also created the Verb, in which such concepts as a continent, an ocean, an island, an archipelago or a lake are precisely adapted to the shape of the Earth.
Against this, the Devil's Advocate will have no difficulty in arguing that the Earth is a creation of blind chance, and that the possibility of using such convenient terms as "continent" and "island" just reflects the chance fact that the areas above water happen to be very short or very lonp very often, and to be unexpectedly seldom of average length.
The preceding example is not as fictitious as it may seem, because the distribution of the sizes of actual island is precisely Paretian.
Hence, our hypothetical debate emphasizes the two extreme outlooks realistically, even though--the Earth having been presumably entirely explored--no actual prediction is involved in the choice between the interpretationof archipelagoes as "real" or as creations of the mind of the weary mariner.
17.
Another example, also chosen for its lack of direct economic inter- Causes, the precise study of such past records will make it possible to better predict where new errors will occur and to minimize their effects.
On the other hand, precisely because of the origin of Figure 2 , the Devil's Advocate can again point out that those beautiful hierarchies of degrees of clustering can very well be due to "mere chance," devoid of any memory and hence entirely useless for purposes of prediction.
Similar critical roles can very well be played in many other contexts, and we think that it is mandatory that somebody play them in every important problem, without forgetting that the Devil's Advocate must always be on the side of the Angels. An interesting example of stable truce between structure and chance is provided by the study of language and of discourse, where the traditional kind of structure is represented by grammar
and--as one should expect by now--the chance mechanism is akin to the law of Pareto.(15).
7.
Two-tailed Pawetian variables and multi-dimensional stable Paretian laws.
We have up to now followed tradition by associating the law of Pareto 19.
However, it is impossible to postpone "explanation" forever. If indeed a grand Economic System is only based upon aggregation, choice and mixture, one can prove that, in order that it be Paretian, it must be triggered somewhere by a Paretian "initial" condition. That is, however useful the method of invariants may be, it is true that it somewhat begs the question, and that the basic mystery cannot be solved by pushing it around. Indeed, if it were true, in accordance with "conventional wisdom",that physical phenomena are characterized by the law of Gauss, and social phenomena by that of Pareto, we may eventually have to explain the latter by some of the "micro-scopic" economic models, such as the "principle" of random proportionate effect (reference 14 ) which we prefer to de-emphasize in our approach.
We claim, however, that such need not be the case. Quite on the contrary, the physical world is full of Paretian phenomena which one can easily visualize as playing the role of the "triggers" that cause the economic system to be also Paretian.
We found for example (reference 12) This example--combined with the problem of the areas of islands and lakes also investigated in section 6--suggests that many of the Paretian phenomena encountered in practice may be related to "accumulative" processes similar to those encountered in coin tossing.
In any event, all the examples of a Paretian behavior show that statisticians will have to pay special attention to distributions-without population moments.
9. An examination of Frederick Macaulay's criticism of the law of Pareto.
Finding so many reasons for considering the law of Pareto as being one of the most important of all probability distributions, we were of course permanently surprised by the "neglect and even contempt" to which we referred in the first sentence of this paper. We eventually found that this 21.
attitude had deep roots not only in the apparent lack of theoretical motivation for that law, but also in several seemingly "definitive" criticisms, and we would like to analyze two often quoted adverse analyses.
We shall begin with F. R. Macaulay's (reference 6 )-We found this essay most impressive and--even though we obviously disagree with its conclusions--we recommend very strongly that it continue to be read. For example, Macaulay points out that an excellent fit of the cumulated expression Pr(U• u) ("global" limit theorems)woy As a result, one had better avoid inferences from densities; if one cannot avoid them, one should not expect them to be very good.
But Macaulay is even more severe and he finds that the empirical curves do not zigzag around the simple Paretian interpolate, but rather cross it systematically a few times. The fact that this observation was used to reject the law of Pareto outright illustrates a basic difference between the outlooks of the careful economists and of the careless physicists:
when the law of Boyle was similarly found to differ from facts, the physicists simply invented the concept of a "perfect gas," that is, a body that follows perfectly Boyle's law. Naturally, perfect-gas approximations are not even considered in some problems (for example, such bodies never cease to be gases, and--whichever the temperature--they cannot become liquid).
22.
However, the perfect-gas approximation is adequate in many cases, and it is so simple that one cannot afford not to consider it first. Similarly, Pareto-law approximations should not even be considered in some problems (for example, those relative to low incomes); but one cannot afford not to consider them first in other investigations.
Macaulay's criticism of the law of Pareto may therefore be summarized from our viewpoint by saying that it only endorses the "weak" forms of this law with which we had occasion to work. In many cases, however, we think that it is legitimate to take more seriously certain Paretian kins, such as the stable distributions.
We Maximization. Now, it is necessary that F(u/aM) -iT F(u/a n); in other words, one must have:
ý log F(U/an) -log F(u/aM).
Aggregation. This requires that G(a as) -T IG(a ns); in other words, one must have:
Yjlog G(a s) -log G(a S).
n a
It turns our therefore that the three types of invariance lead to formerly almost identical equations, although they refer to different functions, respectively Fw, log FM and log GA(S). with an alphsl close to 1/2, so that the population womnt is surely infinite. 
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